About Me

Welcome! I am an economist interested in the intersection of microeconomic theory, econometrics, and experimental methods. My research focuses on two related questions: how to uncover the empirical foundations of economic modeling from individual choice data, and how strategic interactions unfold in settings with private information — including decentralized protocols. I am currently a Senior Associate at Charles River Associates in the Antitrust and Competition Practice. Prior to this, I was a Postdoctoral Scholar at the UC Berkeley Department of Economics, where I also earned my Ph.D.

You can find Python implementations of different tools that I have developed for my research in my GitHub page.

Please feel free to reach out to me at cristian (at) cristianugarte.com

Research Papers

Preference Recoverability from Inconsistent Choices

We study the analysis of choices imperfectly aligned with the preference relation that drives them. First, we develop a measure of decision-making quality that, unlike the existing ones, ensures to asymptotically measure the distance between the subject's choices and her underlying preference (instead of some preference). We then use such a measure to propose a statistically consistent preference estimator. Empirical results suggest consistency is a relevant property when recovering preferences, especially for complex choice environments, compared to estimators based on intuitive motivations.

The Behavioral Restrictions of a Differentiable Utility

Economic models usually endow agents with (well-behaved) differentiable utilities. However, there is no clarity on what, if any, behaviors are ruled out by making this assumption. I study conditions under which consumer choices can be rationalized by a differentiable utility, i.e., smoothly rationalized. Starting from the observation that differentiability implies that indifferent choices have the same marginal rate of substitution, I develop an exact test for smooth rationalization. I also show that the existence of higher-order derivatives, commonly used for comparative statics, does not impose any behavioral restrictions. I test smooth rationalization into several experimental data sets and find that, in most cases, choices are consistent with a differentiable utility.

The generality of the Strong Axiom

Economic Theory, (2025)

Economic research usually endows consumers with a strictly concave utility function. When choices are rationalizable, this assumption can be tested by the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences, SARP, as if they fail such a test, the convexity of the utility is not strict. We extend this test to non-rationalizable choices using partial efficiency, the most popular method to recover preferences. Under partial efficiency, a strictly convex utility cannot be tested. Hence, the existence of a strictly concave utility is falsified if, and only if, choices are rationalizable but fail SARP, which we do not observe in laboratory data. From an empirical standpoint, our results suggest that assuming a strictly concave utility does not carry a cost.

Mathematical Finance, Information Flow, and Economic Growth in pre-industrial Europe

Old (and dormant) work for the Econ History class at UC Berkeley. Not as polished, but still a pretty cool result.

This paper studies the role of financial techniques development in Europe's economic growth from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. During this era, mathematicians developed the main advances in finance, and Fibonacci’s book Liber Abaci is undoubtedly the most important development. This paper uses the publications of mathematics books as a measure of exposure to new financial techniques, and exploits city-level data. Results suggest that the of exposure to new financial technologies had a causal effect in economic growth before the sixteenth century. The presence of reverse causality and measurement error after the invention of the printing press make the effect impossible to identify after the sixteenth century.

Work in Progress

On the Incentive Compatibility of the Bitcoin Protocol

(with Marcelo Arenas and Martín Ugarte)

Contrary to traditional payment systems, Bitcoin does not rely on a trusted central authority to maintain a ledger of transactions. Instead, it relies on a protocol based on a free-entry market, where several actors (called miners) compete for appending blocks of transactions to the ledger. We model the Bitcoin protocol as a game of incomplete information. We show that previous studies of the incentives behind the Bitcoin protocol consider oversimplified models, either (1) ignoring important technical aspects of the protocol or (2) analyzing the strategy of a single player without considering the equilibria of the game. We apply our model to show that the strategy known as "selfish mining" is only profitable because of the difficulty adjustment of the protocol, and that the game has an "honest" equilibrium in which all miners append newly mined blocks to the blockchain.

Ultimatum Games on Budget Sets

(with Yu-Ting Ho and
Shachar Kariv
)

We develop an experimental study of the ultimatum game and analyze the result through the logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE). The decision problems are presented using a novel graphical experimental interface, generating a rich individual-level data set, which allows us to understand what strategies this equilibrium concept identifies as more rational. It also sheds light on the equilibrium selection problem for the logit QRE model.

A geometric proof of Afriat Theorem

Using a geometric argument, I present a non-constructive proof of Afriat Theorem. The proof intuitively explains what Paul Samuelson described as the “eternal darkness” of decision theory: that a rationalizing utility can always be chosen to be convex. The proof also sheds light on why concavity might be loss as the number of observations goes to infinity, but quasiconcavity (concavity of the upper contour sets) is preserved.

CV

You can download my CV here.